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Abstract
We study a security threat to reinforcement learn-
ing where an attacker poisons the learning envi-
ronment to force the agent into executing a target
policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we
consider RL agents whose objective is to find a
policy that maximizes average reward in undis-
counted infinite-horizon problem settings. The
attacker can manipulate the rewards or the tran-
sition dynamics in the learning environment at
training-time and is interested in doing so in a
stealthy manner. We propose an optimization
framework for finding an optimal stealthy attack
for different measures of attack cost. We provide
sufficient technical conditions under which the
attack is feasible and provide lower/upper bounds
on the attack cost. We instantiate our attacks in
two settings: (i) an offline setting where the agent
is doing planning in the poisoned environment,
and (ii) an online setting where the agent is learn-
ing a policy using a regret-minimization frame-
work with poisoned feedback. Our results show
that the attacker can easily succeed in teaching
any target policy to the victim under mild condi-
tions and highlight a significant security threat to
reinforcement learning agents in practice.
1. Introduction
Understanding adversarial attacks on learning algorithms is
critical to finding security threats against the deployed ma-
chine learning systems and in designing novel algorithms
robust to those threats. We focus on training-time adversar-
ial attacks on learning algorithms, also known as data poi-
soning attacks (Huang et al., 2011; Biggio & Roli, 2018;
Zhu, 2018). Different from test-time attacks where the
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adversary perturbs test data to change the algorithm’s de-
cisions, poisoning attacks manipulate the training data to
change the algorithm’s decision-making policy itself.
Most of the existing work on data poisoning attacks has
focused on supervised learning algorithms (Biggio et al.,
2012; Mei & Zhu, 2015; Xiao et al., 2015; Alfeld et al.,
2016; Li et al., 2016; Koh et al., 2018). In contemporary
works, researchers have explored data poisoning attacks
against stochastic multi-armed bandits (Jun et al., 2018;
Liu & Shroff, 2019) and contextual bandits (Ma et al.,
2018), which belong to family of online learning algo-
rithms with limited feedback— such algorithms are widely
used in real-world applications such as news article recom-
mendation (Li et al., 2010) and web advertisements rank-
ing (Chapelle et al., 2014). The feedback loop in online
learning makes these applications easily susceptible to data
poisoning, e.g., attacks in the form of click baits (Miller
et al., 2011). In this paper, we focus on data poisoning at-
tacks against reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, an
online learning paradigm for sequential decision-making
under uncertainty (Sutton & Barto, 2018).1 Given that RL
algorithms are increasingly used in critical applications, in-
cluding cyber-physical systems (Li & Qiu, 2019) and per-
sonal assistive devices (Rybski et al., 2007), it is of utmost
importance to investigate the security threat to RL algo-
rithms against different forms of poisoning attacks.
1.1. Overview of our Results and Contributions
In the following, we discuss a few of the types/dimensions
of poisoning attacks in RL in order to highlight the novelty
of our work in comparison to existing work.
Type of adversarial manipulation. Existing works on
poisoning attacks against RL have studied the manipula-
tion of rewards only (Zhang & Parkes, 2008; Zhang et al.,
2009; Ma et al., 2019; Huang & Zhu, 2019). A key novelty
of our work is that we study environment poisoning, i.e.,
manipulating rewards or manipulating transition dynamics.
1Poisoning attacks is also mathematically equivalent to the
formulation of machine teaching with teacher being the adver-
sary (Zhu et al., 2018). However, the problem of designing opti-
mized environments for teaching a target policy to an RL agent is
not well-understood in machine teaching.
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For certain applications, it is more natural to manipulate the
transition dynamics instead of the rewards, such as (i) the
inventory management problem setting where state transi-
tions are controlled by demand and supply of products in a
market and (ii) conversational agents where the state is rep-
resented by the history of conversations. Through our pro-
posed optimization framework, we show that the problem
of optimally poisoning transition dynamics is a lot more
challenging than that of poisoning rewards, and the attack
might not be always feasible. We provide sufficient techni-
cal conditions which ensures attacker’s success and provide
lower/upper bounds on the attack cost.
Objective of the learning agent. Existing works have
focused on studying RL agents that maximizes cumula-
tive reward in discounted problem settings. In our work,
we consider RL agents that maximizes average reward
in undiscounted infinite-horizon settings (Puterman, 1994;
Mahadevan, 1996)—this is a more suitable objective for
many real-world applications that have cyclic tasks or tasks
without absorbing states, e.g., inventory management and
scheduling problems (Tadepalli et al., 1994; Puterman,
1994), and a robot learning to avoid obstacles (Mahade-
van & Connell, 1992). This subtle difference in RL objec-
tive leads to technical challenges because of the absence of
the contraction property that comes from the usual discount
factor (Mahadevan, 1996). The results and bounds we pro-
vide are based on several measures of the problem setting
including Hajnal measure of the transition kernel and di-
ameter of the Markov chain induced by target policy in the
original unpoisoned environment. Another reason we are
considering average reward objective is because there are
well-studied online RL algorithms for this objective using
regret-minimization framework as discussed next.
Offline planning and online learning. Existing works
have focused on attacks in an offline setting where the ad-
versary first poisons the reward function in the environment
and then the RL agent finds a policy via planning (Zhang
& Parkes, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2019). In
contrast, we call a setting as online where the adversary
interacts with a learning agent to manipulate the feedback
signals. One of the key differences in these two settings
is in measuring attacker’s cost: The `∞-norm of manipu-
lation is commonly studied for the offline setting; for the
online setting, the cumulative cost of attack over time (e.g.,
measured by `1-norm of manipulations) is more relevant
and has not been studied in literature. We instantiate our
attacks in both the settings with appropriate notions of at-
tack cost. For the online learning setting, we consider an
agent who is learning a policy using regret-minimization
framework (Auer & Ortner, 2007; Jaksch et al., 2010).
We note that our attacks are constructive, and we pro-
vide numerical simulations to support our theoretical state-
ments. Our results demonstrate that the attacker can easily
succeed in teaching (forcing) the victim to execute the de-
sired target policy at a minimal cost.
2. Environment and RL Agent
We consider a standard RL setting, based on Markov deci-
sion processes and RL agents that optimize their expected
utility. In contrast to prior work on reward poisoning at-
tacks that assume RL agents are optimizing their total dis-
counted rewards, we focus on the average reward optimal-
ity criterion, as specified in more detail in the following
subsections.
2.1. Environment, Policy, and Optimality Criteria
The environment is a Markov Decision Process (MDP) de-
fined as M = (S,A,R, P ), where S is the state space, A
is the action space, R : S × A→ R is the reward function,
and P : S×A×S → [0, 1] is the state transition dynamics,
i.e., P (s, a, s′) denotes the probability of reaching state s′
when taking action a in state s. We denote a determinis-
tic policy by pi, which is a map from states to actions, i.e.,
pi : S → A.
In our work, we consider average reward optimality cri-
teria in undiscounted infinite-horizon settings (Puterman,
1994; Mahadevan, 1996)—-this optimality criteria is par-
ticularly suitable for applications that have cyclic tasks
or tasks without absorbing states (see discussion in Sec-
tion 1.1). Given an initial state s, the expected average re-
ward of a policy pi in MDP M is given by ρ(pi,M, s) :=
limN→∞ 1NE
[∑N−1
t=0 R(st, at)|s0 = s, pi
]
, where the ex-
pectation is over the rewards received by the agent when
starting from initial state s0 = s and following the policy pi.
Under mild conditions, the above limit exists and the value
ρ(pi,M, s) is independent of the initial state s. In this
paper, we will assume the condition that the MDP is er-
godic, which implies that every policy pi has a stationary
distribution µpi , and µpi(s) > 0 for every state s (Put-
erman, 1994). When ergodicity holds, the average re-
ward or gain of a policy can be computed as ρ(pi,M) =∑
s∈S µ
pi(s)R(s, pi(s)); we also denote this as ρpi when the
MDPM is clear from context. For an overview of average-
reward RL, we refer the reader to (Puterman, 1994; Ma-
hadevan, 1996; Even-Dar et al., 2005).
A policy pi∗ is optimal if for every other deterministic
policy pi we have ρpi
∗ ≥ ρpi, and -robust optimal if
ρpi
∗ ≥ ρpi +  also holds. Finally, we define a coefficient
α = mins,a,s′,a′
∑
x∈S min
(
P (s, a, x), P (s′, a′, x)
)
.
Note that (1−α) is equivalent to Hajnal measure of P (Put-
erman, 1994).
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(a) Poisoning attack against an RL agent doing offline planning
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(b) Poisoning attack against an RL agent doing online learning
Figure 1: (a) Adversary first poisons the environment by manipulating reward function and transition dynamics, then,
the RL agent finds an optimal policy via planning algorithms based on Dynamic Programming (Puterman, 1994). (b)
Adversary interacts with an RL agent to manipulate the feedback signals; here, we consider an agent who is learning a
policy using regret-minimization framework (Auer & Ortner, 2007; Jaksch et al., 2010).
2.2. RL Agent
We consider RL agents with average reward optimality cri-
teria in the following two settings (also, see Figure 1).
Offline planning agent. In the offline setting, an RL agent
is given an MDP M , and chooses a deterministic optimal
policy pi∗ ∈ arg maxpi ρ(pi,M). The optimal policy can
be found via planning algorithms based on Dynamic Pro-
gramming such as value iteration (Puterman, 1994).
Online learning agent. In the online setting, an RL agent
does not know the MDP M (i.e., R and P are unknown).
At each step t, the agent stochastically chooses an ac-
tion at based on the previous observations, and then as
feedback it obtains reward rt and transitions to the next
state st+1. In this paper, we consider an agent who is us-
ing a learning algorithm to take actions based on regret-
minimization framework. Performance of such a learner
in MDP M is measured by its regret which after T steps
is given by REGRET(T,M) = ρ∗ · T −∑T−1t=0 rt , where
ρ∗ := ρ(pi∗,M) is the optimal average reward. We only
consider agents with an algorithm promising a sublinear
bound for total expected regret, i.e., E [REGRET(T,M)] is
o(T ). We note that well-studied algorithms with sublinear
regret exist for average reward criteria, e.g., UCRL algo-
rithm (Auer & Ortner, 2007; Jaksch et al., 2010) and al-
gorithms based on posterior sampling method (Agrawal &
Jia, 2017).
3. Attack Models and Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the problem of adversarial at-
tacks on the RL agent in both the offline and online settings.
In what follows, the original MDP (before poisoning) is de-
noted byM = (S,A,R, P ), and an overline is added to the
corresponding quantities before poisoning, such as ρpi , µpi ,
and α.
The attacker has a target policy pi† and poisons the envi-
ronment with the goal of teaching/forcing the RL agent to
executing this policy.2 The attacker is interested in doing a
2Our results can be translated to attacks against the Batch RL
stealthy attack with minimal cost to avoid being detected.3
We assume that the attacker knows the original MDP M ,
i.e., the original reward function R and state transition dy-
namics P . This assumption is standard in the existing lit-
erature on poisoning attacks against RL. The attacker re-
quires that the RL agent behaves as specified in Section 2,
however the attacker doesn’t know the agent’s algorithm or
internal parameters.
3.1. Attack Against an Offline Planning Agent
In attacks against an offline planning agent, the attacker
manipulates the original MDP M = (S,A,R, P ) to a poi-
soned MDP M̂ = (S,A, R̂, P̂ ) which is then used by the
RL agent for finding the optimal policy, see Figure 1a.
Goal of the attack. Given a margin parameter , the at-
tacker poisons the reward function or the transition dynam-
ics so that the target policy pi† is -robust optimal in the
poisoned MDP M̂ , i.e., the following condition holds:
ρ(pi†, M̂) ≥ ρ(pi, M̂) + , ∀pi 6= pi†. (1)
Cost of the attack. We consider two notions of costs de-
fined in terms of `p-norm of differences in reward functions
(i.e., R and R̂) and in transition dynamics (i.e., P and P̂ ).
For attacks via poisoning rewards, we quantify the cost as∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥
p
=
(∑
s,a
(∣∣R̂(s, a)−R(s, a)∣∣)p)1/p,
where we treated the reward functions as vectors of length
|S| · |A| with values R(s, a). For attacks via poisoning
transition dynamics, we quantify the cost as follows:∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
=
(∑
s,a
(∑
s′
∣∣P̂ (s, a, s′)− P (s, a, s′)∣∣)p)1/p.
agent studied by (Ma et al., 2019) where the attacker poisons the
training data used by the agent to learn MDP parameters.
3Note that the attacks that we will study in subsequent sec-
tions will be poisoning either rewards only or transition dynamics
only. In a general attack manipulating both the rewards and dy-
namics simultaneously, one needs to appropriately combine the
costs (also, refer to discussion in Section 7).
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Here, we have computed `p-norm of a vector of length |S| ·
|A| where the value for each (s, a) is given by the `1-norm
of difference of two distributions P̂ (s, a, .) and P (s, a, .).
3.2. Attack Against an Online Learning Agent
In attacks against an online learning agent, the attacker
at time t manipulates the reward function R(st, at) and
transition dynamics P (st, at, .) for the current state st and
agent’s action at, see Figure 1b. Then, at time t, the (poi-
soned) reward rt is obtained from R̂t(st, at) instead of
R(st, at) and the (poisoned) next state st+1 is sampled
from P̂t(st, at, .) instead of P (st, at, .).
Goal of the attack. Specification of the attacker’s goal in
this online setting is not as straightforward as that in the of-
fline setting, primarily because the agent might never con-
verge to any stationary policy. In our work, at time t when
the current state is st, we measure the mismatch of agent’s
action at w.r.t. the target policy pi† as 1 [at 6= pi†(st)] where
1 [.] denotes the indicator function. With this, we define
a notion of average mismatch of learner’s actions in time
horizon T as follows:
AVGMISS(T ) =
1
T
·
( T−1∑
t=0
1 [at 6= pi†(st)]
)
. (2)
The goal of the attacker is to ensure that AVGMISS(T ) is
o(1), or, alternatively, the total number of time steps where
there is a mismatch is o(T ).
Cost of the attack. We consider a notion of average cost
of attack in time horizon T denoted as AVGCOST(T ). For
reward poisoning attacks, AVGCOST(T ) is
1
T
·
( T−1∑
t=0
(∣∣R̂t(st, at)−R(st, at)∣∣)p)1/p,
and for dynamics poisoning attacks, AVGCOST(T ) is
1
T
·
( T−1∑
t=0
(∑
s′
∣∣P̂t(st, at, s′)− P (st, at, s′)∣∣)p)1/p.
Note that here the `p-norm is defined over a vector of length
T with values quantifying the attack cost at each time step
t. One of the key differences in measuring attacker’s cost
for offline and online settings is the use of appropriate
norm. While the `∞-norm of manipulation is most suitable
and commonly studied for the offline setting; for the online
setting, the cumulative cost of attack over time measured
by `1-norm is most relevant.
4. Attacks in Offline Setting
In this section, we introduce and analyze attacks against
an offline planing agent that derives its policy using a poi-
soned MDP M̂ . The attacker tries to minimally change the
original MDP M , while at the same time ensuring that the
target policy is optimal in the modified MDP M̂ .
4.1. Overview of the Approach
To formulate optimization problems explicitly and provide
bounds on the quality of obtainable solutions, we first de-
fine concepts that enable us do the following: i) reduce
the complexity of achieving the attacker’s goal explained
in Section 3.1, ii) quantify how much change is required
in rewards or transitions. To find MDP M̂ for which the
target policy is -robust optimal, one could directly utilize
constraints expressed by (1). However, the number of con-
straints in (1) equals (|A||S| − 1), i.e., it is exponential
in |S|, making optimization problems that directly utilize
them intractable. We show that it is enough to satisfy these
constraints for (|S| · |A| − |S|) policies that we call neigh-
bors of the target policy and which we define as follows:
Definition 1. For a policy pi, its neighbor policy pi{s; a} is
defined as
pi{s; a}(x) =
{
pi(x) x 6= s
a x = s
.
The following lemma provides a simple verification crite-
ria for examining whether a policy of interest is -robust
optimal in a given MDP. Its proof can be found in the sup-
plementary material.
Lemma 1. Policy pi is -robust optimal iff we have ρpi ≥
ρpi{s;a} +  for every state s and action a 6= pi(s).
In other words, Lemma 1 implies that (sub)optimality of
the target policy can be deduced by examining its neigh-
bor policies. By using the definition of average rewards,
we conclude that the attacker’s strategy, which consists
of modifying MDP M = (S,A,R, P ) to MDP M̂ =
(S,A, R̂, P̂ ), is successful if and only if for each state s
and action a 6= pi†(s) we have:∑
s′
µ̂pi†(s′) · R̂(s′, pi†(s′)) ≥ (3)∑
s′
µ̂pi†{s;a}(s′) · R̂(s′, pi†{s; a}(s′))+ .
To simplify the exposition of our results, we introduce the
following quantity w.r.t. MDP M for all s ∈ S, a ∈ A:
χpi (s, a) =

[
ρpi{s;a}−ρpi+
µpi{s;a}(s)
]+
for a 6= pi(s),
0 for a = pi(s).
(4)
Here, [x]+ is equal to max{0, x}. As we show in our for-
mal results, the amount of change needed in modifying the
original MDP M to MDP M̂ so that (3) holds is captured
through χpi .
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4.2. Attacks in Offline Setting via Poisoning Rewards
The first attack we consider is an attack on an offline
planning agent via poisoning rewards, where the attacker’s
strategy consists of choosing a new reward function which
makes the target policy -robust optimal. In this attack we
have P̂ = P , and hence µ̂pi is equal to µpi for any policy
pi, so µ̂pi can be precomputed based on MDP M . This al-
lows us to formulate an optimization problem for finding
an optimal reward poisoning attack using condition (3):
min
R
∥∥R−R∥∥
p
(P1)
s.t. condition (3) holds with R̂ = R and µ̂ = µ.
In this optimization problem, the constraints are obtained
by using condition (3) for specific instantiation of R̂ and
µ̂. In particular, we set R̂ to be the optimization variable
R, and µ̂ to be the stationary distributions of the original
transition kernel P (i.e., µ).
The optimization problem (P1) is a tractable convex pro-
gram with linear constraints, and we show it is always fea-
sible. Additionally, the following results provide lower and
upper bounds on the attack cost, that is, on the cost of so-
lution R̂.
Theorem 1. The optimization problem (P1) is always fea-
sible, and the cost of the optimum solution is bounded by
α
2
· ∥∥χpi† ∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥p ≤ ∥∥χpi† ∥∥p .
The proof of the theorem can be found in the supplemen-
tary material. The lower bound on the cost of the at-
tack is obtained by extending the proof technique of (Ma
et al., 2019) to the average reward criterion, and it de-
pends on two factors. The first factor, α2 (see the defini-
tion in Section 2.1), is related to the Hajnal measure of
the original MDP M . The second factor,
∥∥χpi† ∥∥∞, cap-
tures the initial disadvantage of the target policy relative
to its neighbor policies, as can be seen from the inequality
χ
pi†
 (s, a) ≥ (ρpi†{s;a} − ρpi†).
The upper bound is obtained by analyzing the optimum so-
lution to a modified version of the optimization problem
(P1) which enforces reward function R̂ to be equal to R for
state-action pairs that define the target policy. We further
discuss the modified optimization problem in Section 5.2.
4.3. Attacks in Offline Setting via Poisoning Dynamics
Let us now consider attacks on an offline planning agent
based on poisoning transition dynamics. The attacker’s
strategy now consists of choosing a new transition dynam-
ics P̂ that makes the target policy -robust optimal. Again,
we would like to utilize condition (3), however, now we
cannot precompute µ̂ since we are modifying the transi-
tion dynamics. We have to explicitly account for that in
our optimization problem, and we can do so by noting that
stationary distribution µ̂pi satisfies:
µ̂pi(s) =
∑
s′
P̂ (s′, pi(s′), s) · µ̂pi(s′). (5)
Therefore, by using condition (3) and R̂ = R, we can for-
mulate an optimization problem for finding an optimal dy-
namics poisoning attack:
min
P,µpi† ,µpi†{s;a}
∥∥P − P∥∥
p
(P2)
s.t. µpi† and P satisfy (5),
∀s, a 6= pi†(s) : µpi†{s;a} and P satisfy (5),
condition (3) holds with R̂ = R and µ̂ = µ,
∀s, a, s′ : P (s, a, s′) ≥ δ · P (s, a, s′).
Here, δ ∈ (0, 1] in the last set of constraints is a given pa-
rameter, specifying how much one is allowed to decrease
the original values of transition probabilities. δ > 0 is a
regularity condition which ensures that the new MDP is er-
godic.4 In the supplementary material, we provide a more
detailed discussion on δ and how to choose it. Furthermore,
the constraints related to condition (3) are obtained by in-
stantiating R̂ and µ̂. In particular, R̂ is set to be the original
reward function R and µ̂ is set to be the optimization vari-
ables µ (i.e., µpi† and µpi†{s;a}).
Since the first and the second set of constraints are
quadratic equality constraints, the optimization problem is
in general non-convex. Furthermore, the third set of con-
straints defined by condition (3) might not even be feasi-
ble, for example, when reward function is constant or al-
most constant (i.e., R(s, a) = R(s′, a′) or more generally
|R(s, a) − R(s′, a′)| ≤ ). In Theorem 2 we provide a
sufficient condition that renders the optimization problem
feasible and we provide bounds on the cost of the attack.
Given the nature of the constraints in (P2), we describe an
approach for finding an approximate solution in Section 6.
To introduce the formal statement, let us first define rel-
evant quantities. Let D
pi
denote the diameter of Markov
chain induced by policy pi in MDP M , i.e., D
pi
=
maxs,s′ T
pi
(s, s′), where T
pi
(s, s′) is the expected time to
reach s′ starting from s and following policy pi. Next we
define value function of a policy and a few related quanti-
ties. Value function of policy pi in MDP M is defined as
V
pi
(s) = lim
N→∞
E
[
N−1∑
t=0
(
R(st, at)− ρpi
)
|s0 = s, pi
]
,
4This follows because strictly positive trajectory probabilities
in MDP M remain strictly positive in the new MDP M̂ , which
further implies that all states remain recurrent and aperiodic.
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where the expectation is over the rewards received by agent
(relative to the offset ρpi) when starting from initial state
s0 = s and following policy pi. Furthermore, let us denote
byB
pi
(s) =
∑
s′ P (s, pi(s), s
′) ·V pi(s′) the expected value
of the next state given the current state s and policy pi. We
also define V
pi
min = mins V
pi
(s) to be the minimum value
of V
pi
, and sp(V
pi
) = maxs V
pi
(s) − mins V pi(s) to be
the span of V
pi
. Finally, we introduce the following two
quantities important for the theorem statement:
• β
pi
δ (s, a) defined as
β
pi
δ (s, a) = R(s, pi(s))−R(s, a) (6)
+B
pi
(s)− V pimin − δ · sp(V
pi
).
• Λ(s, a) defined as
Λ(s, a) =

χ
pi†
0 (s,a)+·(1+D
pi† )
χ
pi†
0 (s,a)+β
pi†
δ (s,a)
if χpi† (s, a) > 0,
0 otherwise,
(7)
where χpi†0 is obtained from χ
pi†
 by setting  = 0.
Theorem 2. If there exists a solution P̂ to the optimization
problem (P2), its cost satisfies∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
·
∥∥∥V pi†∥∥∥
∞
≥ δ · α
2
· ∥∥χpi†0 ∥∥∞ .
If for every state s and action a, it holds that either
β
pi†
δ (s, a) ≥  · (1 + D
pi†
) OR χ
pi†
 (s, a) = 0, then the
optimization problem (P2) has a solution P̂ whose cost is
upper bounded by
∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
≤ 2 · ∥∥Λ∥∥
p
.
The proof can be found in the supplementary material. The
proof technique for the first claim is similar to the one used
for proving the lower bound in Theorem 1.
The sufficient condition of Theorem 2 suggests that the ini-
tial disadvantage of the target policy pi† relative to its neigh-
bor policy pi†{s; a} (captured by χpi† (s, a)) can be over-
come if βpi†δ (s, a) is large enough. This in turn means that
either R(s, pi†(s)) is sufficiently larger than R(s, a), or the
future prospect of the target policy (i.e., B
pi†
(s)) is greater
than the myopic disadvantage (i.e., R(s, a)−R(s, pi†(s))),
by a margin which depends on the value function V
pi† . The
proof for the upper bound is constructive, and it is based
on an attack that treats state ssink ∈ arg mins′ V pi†(s′) as
a sink state. Then, we shift transitions of state-action pairs
that have χpi† (s, a) > 0 towards this sink state. Notice that
this is a type of an attack that does not alter the transition
dynamics for the the target policy. We further discuss this
type of attacks in Section 5.3.
5. Attacks in Online Setting
We now turn to attacks on an agent that learns over time
using the environment feedback. Unlike the planning agent
from the previous section, an online learning agent derives
its policy from the interaction history, i.e., tuples of the
form (st, at, rt, st+1). To attack an online learning agent,
an attacker changes the environment feedback, i.e., reward
rt or state st+1.
5.1. Overview of the Approach
The underlying idea behind our approach is to utilize the
fact that a learning agent has a bounded regret, and thus
chooses a suboptimal action a bounded number of times.
Hence, to steer a learning agent toward selecting the target
policy, it suffices for the attacker to provide the feedback
(i.e., reward rt and the next state st+1) sampled from an
MDP in which the target policy is -robust optimal. Such
an MDP can be derived using the results from the previ-
ous sections. We first show that this approach is sound:
assuming that an ergodic MDP M has pi† as its -robust
optimal policy, the expected number of steps in which a
learner whose experience is drawn from MDP M deviates
from pi† is of order E [REGRET(T,M)].
Lemma 2. Consider an ergodic MDP M that has pi†
as its -robust optimal policy, and an online learn-
ing agent whose expected regret on an MDP M is
E [REGRET(T,M)]. The average mismatch of the agent
is bounded by E [AVGMISS(T )] ≤ 1T ·K(T,M), where
K(T,M) =
µmax

·
(
E [REGRET(T,M)] + 2 ‖V pi†‖∞
)
,
(8)
with µmax := maxs,a µpi†{s;a}(s). Here, µpi and V pi are re-
spectively the stationary distribution and the value function
of a policy pi on MDP M .
The proof of the lemma can be found in the supplementary
material. The lemma implies that o(1) average mismatch
can be achieved in expectation using the sampling based
attack described above, assuming that M̂ is ergodic and
that pi† is its -robust optimal policy. Since the solutions
to the optimization problems (P1) and (P2) from Section 4
satisfy this, the lemma applies to them as well.
However, the expected average cost of such an attack could
be Ω(1) (non-diminishing over time) for a learner with
subliner expected regret, unless the original and the sam-
pling MDP have equal rewards and transition probabilities
for the state-action pairs of the target policy. Intuitively,
if a learner follows the target policy and there exists s
for which R̂(s, pi†(s)) 6= R(s, pi†(s)) or P̂ (s, pi†(s), .) 6=
P (s, pi†(s), .), then the attacker would incur a non-zero cost
whenever the learner visits s. To avoid this issue, we need
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to enforce constraints on the sampling MDP specifying that
the attack does not alter rewards and transitions that corre-
spond to the state-action pairs of the target policy. This
brings us to the following template that we utilize for at-
tacks on an online learner:
• Modify the optimization problems (P1) and (P2)
by respectively adding constraints R̂(s, pi†(s)) =
R(s, pi†(s)) and P̂ (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′).
• Obtain the sampling MDP M̂ by solving the more con-
strained version of (P1) or (P2).
• Use the sampling MDP M̂ instead of the environment
M during the learning process, i.e., obtain rt from
R̂(st, at) in the case of poisoning rewards and st+1 ∼
P̂ (st, at, .) in the case of poisoning dynamics (see Fig-
ure 1b).
5.2. Attacks in Online Setting via Poisoning Rewards
For the case of attacks via poisoning rewards, the sampling
MDP M̂ differs from the original MDP M only in its re-
ward function R̂. Following the attack template from the
above, we first find R̂ using a modified version of (P1)
which ensures that R̂(s, pi†(s)) = R(s, pi†(s)), i.e.:
min
R
∥∥R−R∥∥
p
(P3)
s.t. ∀s : R(s, pi†(s)) = R(s, pi†(s)),
all constraints from problem (P1).
As we show in the supplementary material, the optimal
solution to the optimization problem (P3) is R̂(s, a) =
R(s, a) − χpi† (s, a). Since χpi† (s, pi†(s)) = 0, using
the definition of AVGCOST(T ) we conclude that an upper
bound on E [AVGCOST(T )] could be computed using (i)
the number of times that a non-target action is selected and
(ii) the maximum value of χpi† (s, a). The quantity in (i) is
specified in the result of Lemma 2, which brings us to the
main result of this subsection.
Theorem 3. Let R̂ be the optimal solution to (P3). Con-
sider the attack defined by rt obtained from R̂(st, at) and
st+1 ∼ P (st, at, .), and an online learning agent whose
expected regret on an MDP M is E [REGRET(T,M)]. The
average mismatch of the learner is in expectation upper
bounded by
E [AVGMISS(T )] ≤ K(T, M̂)
T
,
where K is defined in (8). Furthermore, the average attack
cost is in expectation upper bounded by
E [AVGCOST(T )] ≤ ∥∥χpi† ∥∥∞ ·
(
K(T, M̂)
)1/p
T
.
5.3. Attacks in Online Setting via Poisoning Dynamics
For the case of attacks via dynamics poisoning, the sam-
pling MDP M̂ differs form the original MDPM in its tran-
sition dynamics P̂ . Following the attack template, we can
derive the optimization problem for finding P̂ by simply
adding the constraints P (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′) in
the optimization problem (P2), i.e.:
min
P,µpi† ,µpi†{s;a}
∥∥P − P∥∥
p
(P4)
s.t. ∀s, s′ : P (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′),
all constraints from problem (P2).
In the supplementary material, we show that the additional
constraint allows us to transform (P4) into a tractable con-
vex program with linear constraints. In fact, the convex
program has a specific structure so that its optimal so-
lution can be obtained by solving |S| · (|A| − 1) sim-
ple convex problems—each of these simpler problems
only involves |S| variables and |S| + 1 linear constraints.
Moreover, the convex program is feasible if the condi-
tions of Theorem 2 are met, and its solutions satisfy∥∥∥P̂ (s, a, .)− P (s, a, .)∥∥∥
1
≤ 2 ·Λ(s, a), where Λ is defined
in (7). Since Λ(s, pi†(s)) = 0, this means that one can
bound E [AVGCOST(T )] based on the number of times that
a non-target action is selected and the maximum value of
Λ(s, a). Combining this insight with Lemma 2, we obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Assume that the sufficient condition of Theo-
rem 2 holds, and let P̂ be the optimal solution to (P4). Con-
sider the attack defined by rt obtained from R(st, at) and
st+1 ∼ P̂ (st, at, .), and an online learning agent whose
expected regret on an MDP M is E [REGRET(T,M)]. The
average mismatch of the learner is in expectation upper
bounded by
E [AVGMISS(T )] ≤ K(T, M̂)
T
,
whereK is defined in (8). Furthermore, the expected attack
cost is upper bounded by
E [AVGCOST(T )] ≤ 2 · ∥∥Λ∥∥∞ ·
(
K(T, M̂)
)1/p
T
,
where Λ is defined in (7).
A direct consequence of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4
is that for a learner with a sublinear expected regret,
the average mismatch and the average cost are ex-
pected to decrease over time as O
(E[REGRET(T,M̂)]
T
)
and
O
(E[REGRET(T,M̂)]1/p
T
)
. Note that while we considered `p
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norms with p ≥ 1 to define the attack cost, the above re-
sults can be generalized to include the case of p = 0. For
p = 0, the expected value of the average cost is simply up-
per bounded by K(T,Mˆ)T , and this follows from Lemma 2.
6. Numerical Simulations
We perform numerical simulations on an environment rep-
resented as an MDP with four states and two actions, see
Figure 2 for details. Even though simple, this environment
provides a very rich and an intuitive problem setting to val-
idate the theoretical statements and understand the effec-
tiveness of the attacks by varying different parameters. We
also vary the number of states in the MDP to check the
efficiency of solving different optimization problems, and
report run times. We further extend our experimental eval-
uation in the supplementary material and report results on
an additional environment.
𝜋"
𝑠$ 𝑠% 𝑠&𝑠'
Figure 2: The environment has |S| = 4 states and |A| = 2
actions given by {left,right}. The original reward
function R is action independent and has the following
values: s1 and s2 are rewarding states with R(s1, .) =
R(s2, .) = 0.5; state s3 has negative reward of R(s3, .) =
−0.5, and the reward of the state s0 given by R(s0, .) will
be varied in experiments. With probability 0.9, the actions
succeed in navigating the agent to left or right as shown on
arrows; with probability 0.1 the agent’s next state is sam-
pled randomly from the set S. The target policy pi† is to
take right action in all states as shown in the illustration.
6.1. Attacks in the Offline Setting: Setup and Results
For the offline setting, we considered the following attack
strategies: (i) RATTACK: reward attacks using R̂ as
solution to problem (P1) (`p-norm with p = 1, 2,∞),
(ii) NT-RATTACK: reward attacks using R̂ as solution
to problem (P3) (solution is independent of `p-norm),
(iii) DATTACK: dynamics attacks using P̂ as a solution
to problem (P2) (`p-norm for p = 1, 2,∞), and (iv)
NT-DATTACK: dynamics attacks using P̂ as a solution to
problem (P4) (solution is independent of `p-norm). The
regularity parameter δ in the problems for solving dynamic
poisoning attacks is set to 0.0001.5
We note that optimal solutions to the problems (P1), (P3),
and (P4) can be computed efficiently using standard opti-
mization techniques (also, refer to discussions in Section 4
5Here, NT- prefix is used to highlight that non-target only ma-
nipulations are allowed in problems (P3) and (P4).
and Section 5). Problem (P2) is computationally more chal-
lenging, and we provide a simple yet effective approach to-
wards finding an approximate solution by iteratively solv-
ing the problem (P4) as follows: First, we use a simple
heuristic to obtain a pool of transition kernels P˜ by pertur-
bations of P that increase the average reward of pi†, and as
second step, we use P˜ ’s from this pool as as input to prob-
lem (P4) instead of P . So, the runtime of solving prob-
lem (P2) depends on the number of iterations we invoke
problem (P4) internally. The implementation details and
code are provided in supplementary materials.
We vary R(s0, .) ∈ [−5, 5] and vary  margin ∈ [0, 1].
We use `∞-norm in the measure of attack cost (see
Section 3.1). The results are reported as an average of
10 runs (here, DATTACK is the only stochastic algorithm
because of the random initialization as discussed above).
There are two key points we want to highlight in Figure 3.
First, as we increase  margin, the attack problem becomes
more difficult: While the reward poisoning attacks are al-
ways feasible (though with increasing attack cost), it is in-
feasible to do dynamics poisoning attacks for  > 0.85.
Second, the plots also show that the solution to the generic
problems (RATTACK and DATTACK for any `p-norm with
p = 1, 2,∞) can have much lower cost compared to so-
lutions obtained by problems allowing non-target only ma-
nipulations (NT-RATTACK and NT-DATTACK).
For the MDP in Figure 2 with |S| = 4, the run times for
solving problems (P1), (P2), (P3), and (P4) are roughly
0.0110s, 3.3010s, 0.0003s, and 0.0339s, respectively. We
further ran experiments on a variant of the MDP with
|S| = 100 (keeping the same linear chain structure as in
Figure 2), and this led to average run times of 0.8326s,
157.2484s, 0.6153s, and 1.1705s, respectively.
6.2. Attacks in the Online Setting: Setup and Results
For the online setting, we considered the following attack
strategies: (i) reward attacks using RATTACK (with
`∞, `1-norm) and NT-RATTACK; (ii) dynamics attacks
using DATTACK (with `∞, `1-norm) and NT-DATTACK;
and (iii) a default setting without adversary denoted as
NONE where environment feedback is sampled from the
original MDP M .
In the experiments, we fix R(s0, .) = −2.5 and  = 0.1;
we plot the measure of the attacker’s achieved goal in terms
of AVGMISS and attacker’s cost in terms of AVGCOST for
`1-norm measured over time t (see Section 3.2). We con-
sider an RL agent implementing the UCRL learning algo-
rithm (Auer & Ortner, 2007), however the attacker does not
use any knowledge of the agent’s learning algorithm. The
results are reported as an average of 20 runs.
The results in Figure 4 show that our proposed online at-
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Figure 3: Results for poisoning attacks in the offline setting from Section 4. (a, b) plots show results for attack on rewards
and (c, d) plots show results for attack on dynamics. Details are in Section 6.1.
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Figure 4: Results for poisoning attacks in the online setting from Section 5. (a, b) plots show results for attack on rewards
and (c, d) plots show results for attack on dynamics. Details are in Section 6.2.
tacks with NT-RATTACK and NT-DATTACK are highly ef-
fective: learner is forced to follow the target policy while
the attacker’s average cost is o(1) (see Theorems 3, 4).
In contrast, we can see that the online attacks with RAT-
TACK and DATTACK lead to high cost for the attacker, i.e.,
the cumulative cost is linear w.r.t. time as anticipated in
Section 5.1 (see discussions following Lemma 2).
7. Conclusion
We studied a security threat to reinforcement learning
(RL) where an attacker poisons the environment, thereby
forcing the agent into executing a target policy. Our
work provides theoretical underpinnings of environment
poisoning against RL along several new attack dimensions,
including (i) adversarial manipulation of the transition
dynamics, (ii) attack against RL agents maximizing
average reward in undiscounted infinite horizon, and (iii)
analyzing different attack costs for offline planning and
online learning settings.
There are several promising directions for future work.
These include expanding the attack models (e.g., attacking
rewards and transitions simultaneously) and broadening the
set of attack goals (e.g., under partial specification of tar-
get policy). At the same time, relaxing the assumptions
on the attacker knowledge of the underlying MDP could
lead to more robust attack strategies. Another interesting
future direction would be to make the studied attack mod-
els more scalable, e.g., applicable to continuous and large
environments. Another interesting topic would be to devise
attack strategies against RL agents that use transfer learn-
ing approaches, especially in multi-agent RL systems, see
(Da Silva & Costa, 2019).
While the paper provides a separate treatment for reward
and transitions attack models, simultaneously attacking re-
wards and transitions might lead to more cost-effective so-
lutions. One possible way to formulate the optimization
problem for the simultaneous attack model is to define
the cost function as a weighted sum of the cost functions
used in (P1) and (P2), and combine the corresponding con-
straints.
While the experimental results demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the studied attack models, they do not reveal
which types of learning algorithms are most vulnerable
to the attack strategies studied in the paper. Further
experimentation using a diverse set of the state of the art
learning algorithms could reveal this, and provide some
guidance in designing defensive strategies and novel RL
algorithms robust to manipulations.
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A. List of Appendices
In this section we provide a brief description of the content provided in the appendices of the paper.
• Appendix B contains additional related work.
• Appendix C provides implementation details and additional experimental evaluation on a different environment.
• Appendix D introduces some useful quantities and a lemma which are useful for proofs.
• Appendix E contains proof of Lemma 1 and some general results used in future proofs.
• Appendix F contains proof of Theorem 1 for offline attacks via poisoning rewards.
• Appendix G contains proof of Theorem 2 for offline attacks via poisoning dynamics and related discussions.
• Appendix H contains proof of Lemma 2.
• Appendix I contains proof of Theorem 3 for online attacks via poisoning rewards.
• Appendix J contains proof of Theorem 4 for online attacks via poisoning dynamics.
B. Additional Related Work
Test-time attacks against RL. A growing body of contemporary works have studied test-time attacks against RL, in
particular, on RL algorithms with neural network policies (Mnih et al., 2015; Schulman et al., 2015). These attacks are
typically done by adding noise in the observed state (e.g., a camera image) to fool the neural network policy into taking
malicious actions (Huang et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2017; Tretschk et al., 2018). Different attack goals have been considered
in these works, e.g., guiding the agent to some adversarial states or forcing agent to take actions that maximizes adversary’s
own rewards. Our work is technically quite different and is focused on training-time attacks where the goal is to force the
agent to learn a target policy.
Teaching an RL agent. Poisoning attacks is mathematically equivalent to the formulation of machine teaching with
teacher being the adversary (Goldman & Kearns, 1995; Singla et al., 2013; 2014; Zhu, 2015; Zhu et al., 2018; Chen et al.,
2018; Mansouri et al., 2019; Peltola et al., 2019; Devidze et al., 2020). In particular, there have been a number of recent
works on teaching an RL agent via providing an optimized curriculum of demonstrations (Cakmak et al., 2012; Walsh &
Goschin, 2012; Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016; Haug et al., 2018; Kamalaruban et al., 2019; Tschiatschek et al., 2019; Brown
& Niekum, 2019). However, these works have focused on imitation-learning based RL agents who learn from provided
demonstrations without any reward feedback (Osa et al., 2018). Given that we consider RL agents who find policies based
on rewards, our work is technically very different from theirs. There is also a related literature on changing the behavior of
an RL agent via reward shaping (Ng et al., 1999; Asmuth et al., 2008); here the reward function is changed to only speed up
the convergence of the learning algorithm while ensuring that the optimal policy in the modified environment is unchanged.
C. Implementation Details and Additional Experiments (Section 6)
In this section, we provide implementation details and report experimental results on a different environment.6
C.1. Implementation Details
The optimal solutions to the problems (P1), (P3), and (P4) can be computed efficiently using standard optimization tech-
niques. In the source code, the solvers for these optimization problems are implemented as the following functions:
• problem (P1) in the function general attack on reward(), see teacher.py
• problem (P3) in the function non target attack on reward(), see teacher.py
• problem (P4) in the function non target attack on dynamics(), see teacher.py
Our approach for solving problem (P2) is implemented in the function general attack on dynamics(), see
teacher.py. Details are provided below:
• As a first step, we use a simple heuristic to obtain a pool of transition kernels P˜ by perturbations of P that increase the
average reward of pi†. Here, the transition kernel P˜ differs from P only for the actions taken by the target policy, i.e.,
(s, pi†(s)) ∀s ∈ S. This pool is created in the function generate pool().
6The source code is available at https://github.com/adishs/icml2020_rl-policy-teaching_code.
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• As the second step, we take each of P˜ ’s from this pool as as input to problem (P4) instead of P which in turn gives us a
corresponding pool of solutions. Note here the problem (P4) modifies only the actions which are not taken by the target
policy, i.e., (s, a) ∀s ∈ S, a 6= pi†(s). This is done in the function solve pool().
• As the final step, we pick a solution from this pool of solutions with the minimal cost. This is done in the function
get P with smallest norm().
C.2. Additional Experiments
We perform additional numerical simulations on an environment represented as an MDP with nine states and two actions
per state, see Figure 5 for details. This environment is inspired from a navigation task and is slightly more complex than
the environment in Figure 2.
𝜋"
𝑠$ 𝑠%𝑠& 𝑠' 𝑠(𝑠) 𝑠*
𝑠+ 𝑠,
Figure 5: The environment has |S| = 9 states and |A| = 2 actions per state as illustrated. The original reward function R
is action independent and has the following values: R(s1, .) = R(s2, .) = R(s3, .) = −2.5, R(s4, .) = R(s5, .) = 1.0,
R(s6, .) = R(s7, .) = R(s8, .) = 0, and the reward of the state s0 given by R(s0, .) will be varied in experiments. With
probability 0.9, the actions succeed in navigating the agent as shown on arrows; with probability 0.1 the agent’s next state
is sampled randomly from the set S. The target policy pi† is to take actions as shown with bold arrows in the illustration.
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Figure 6: Results for poisoning attacks in the offline setting from Section 4. (a, b) plots show results for attack on rewards
and (c, d) plots show results for attack on dynamics.
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Figure 7: Results for poisoning attacks in the online setting from Section 5. (a, b) plots show results for attack on rewards
and (c, d) plots show results for attack on dynamics.
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The experimental setup and attack strategies used for these additional experiments are exactly same as that used in Section 6
for both the offline and the online settings. To recall, for the offline setting, we vary R(s0, .) ∈ [−5, 5] and vary  margin
∈ [0, 1]. We use `∞-norm in the measure of attack cost. The results are reported as an average of 10 runs. For the online
setting, we fix R(s0, .) = −2.5 and  = 0.1. We plot the measure of the attacker’s achieved goal in terms of AVGMISS and
attacker’s cost in terms of AVGCOST for `1-norm measured over time t. The results are reported as an average of 20 runs.
While the scales of cost and mismatch are different, the key takeaway results from Figure 6 (offline setting) and Figure 7
(online setting) are same as discussed in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 respectively.
D. Background
Throughout many proofs, we will use relative values defined in average reward reinforcement learning. Relative values or
bias values of policy pi are defined as following7:
Qpi(s, a) = lim
N→∞
E
[
N−1∑
t=0
(
R(st, at)− ρpi
)
|s0 = s, a0 = a, pi
]
,
where s0 and a0 are the initial state and we follow policy pi after taking action a0 in state s0. We will often refer to relative
values as Q values. These values satisfy the following recurrence equation
Qpi(s, a) = R(s, a)− ρpi +
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)Qpi(s′, pi(s′)).
By definition we have V pi(s) = Qpi(s, pi(s)). Based on Corollary 8.2.7 in (Puterman, 1994), these values can be calculated
by solving set of equations
V pi(s) = R(s, pi(s))− ρpi +
∑
s′∈S
P (s, pi(s), s′)V pi(s′) (9)∑
s∈S
µpi(s)V pi(s) = 0 (10)
for V pi(s) values and setting
Qpi(s, a) = R(s, a)− ρpi +
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)V pi(s′). (11)
We rely on the following result of Even-Dar et al. (2005).
Lemma 3. (Lemma 7 in (Even-Dar et al., 2005)) For two policies pi and pi′ we have:
ρpi − ρpi′ =
∑
s∈S
µpi
′
(s)
(
Qpi(s, pi(s))−Qpi(s, pi′(s))).
E. Proofs for Offline Attacks: Lemma 1 (Section 4.1)
We prove Lemma 1 through several intermediate results. The first one is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.
Corollary 1. For any policy pi and its neighbor policy pi{s; a} we have:
ρpi − ρpi{s;a} = µpi{s;a}(s)(Qpi(s, pi(s))−Qpi(s, a)).
Next, we provide a sufficient condition for a policy pi to be uniquely optimal.
Lemma 4. If we have ρpi ≥ ρpi{s;a}+  for every state s and action a 6= pi(s), and  > 0, then pi is the only optimal policy.
7 This limit assumes that all policies are aperiodic. For periodic policies, we need to use the Cesaro limit (Mahadevan, 1996).
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Proof. Let arbitrary s ∈ S and a ∈ A be such that a 6= pi(s). Based on corollary 1, we have
Qpi(s, pi(s))−Qpi(s, a) = ρ
pi − ρpi{s;a}
µpi{s;a}(s)
> 0. (12)
Note that in this paper we are focusing on recurrent MDPs, thus, we know µpi{s;a}(s) > 0. Now let pi′ 6= pi be a policy
with pi′(s′) = a′ 6= pi(s′). Using (12) we have
ρpi − ρpi′ =
∑
s∈S
µpi
′
(s)
(
Qpi(s, pi(s))−Qpi(s, pi′(s))) ≥ µpi′(s′)(Qpi(s′, a′)−Qpi(s′, pi(s′))) > 0
We again used the fact that MDP is recurrent to say µpi
′
(s′) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The necessity of the condition follows directly from the definition of -robust policies. Let us focus on its suffi-
ciency.
Consider deterministic policies pi, and denote the Hamming distance between two policies pi1 and pi2 by DH(pi1, pi2),
i.e., DH(pi1, pi2) =
∑
s∈S 1 [pi1(s) 6= pi2(s)] where 1 [.] denotes the indicator function. Assume that the condition of the
proposition holds for policy pi∗, i.e., that ρpi
∗ ≥ ρpi1 +  for all pi1 s.t. DH(pi1, pi∗) = 1.
Lemma 4 implies that pi∗ is uniquely optimal. Now, consider policy pik s.t. DH(pik, pi∗) = k > 1. Since pi∗ is (uniquely)
optimal and the MDP is recurrent (µpi
∗
(s) > 0), we have that
ρpi
∗ − ρpik =
∑
s∈S
µpi
∗
(s) · [Qpik(s, pi∗(s))−Qpik(s, pik(s))] > 0,
which implies that there exists sk ∈ S s.t. [Qpik(sk, pi∗(sk))−Qpik(sk, pik(sk))] > 0. Define policy pik−1 as
pik−1(s) =
{
pi∗(s) if s = sk
pik(s) otw.
We have that
ρpik−1 = ρpik +
∑
s∈S
µpik−1(s) · [Qpik(s, pik−1(s))−Qpik(s, pik(s))]
= ρpik + µpik−1(sk) · [Qpik(sk, pi∗(sk))−Qpik(sk, pik(sk))] ≥ ρpik .
Therefore, by induction, we know that there exists a policy pi1 such that ρpik ≤ ρpi1 and DH(pi1, pi∗) = 1. Utilizing our
initial assumption, we obtain that ρpi
∗ ≥ ρpi +  for all pi 6= pi∗, which proves that pi∗ is -robust optimal if the condition of
the proposition holds.
F. Proofs for Offline Attacks: Poisoning Rewards (Section 4.2)
We break the proof of Theorem 1 into two parts: In Appendix F.1, we prove the lower bound in the theorem, and in
Appendix F.2 we show the upper bound and feasibility claim for the attack.
F.1. Proofs for the Lower Bound in Theorem 1
To prove the lower bound in Theorem 1, we will use a proof technique that is similar to the one presented in (Ma et al.,
2019), but adapted to our setting (the average reward criterion).
First, let us define operator F as
F (Q,R, ρ, P, pi)(s, a) = R(s, a)− ρ+
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)V pi(s′), (13)
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or in vector notation
F (Q,R, ρ, P, pi) = R− ρ · 1 + P · V pi,
where V pi(s′) = Q(s′, pi(s′)) (and pi is a deterministic policy). Furthermore, we defined the span of X as sp(X) =
maxiX(i)−miniX(i) - as argued in (Puterman, 1994), sp is a seminorm.
Lemma 5. The following holds:
sp(F (Q1, R, ρ, P, pi)− F (Q2, R, ρ, P, pi)) ≤ (1− α) · sp(Q1 −Q2),
where
α = min
s,a,s′,a′
∑
x∈S
min{P (s, a, x), P (s′, a′, x)}.
Proof. We have that
sp(F (Q1, R, ρ, P, pi)− F (Q2, R, ρ, P, pi)) = sp(P · (V pi1 − V pi2 )).
Following the proof of Proposition 6.6.1 in (Puterman, 1994), we obtain that for b(x, s, a, s′, a′) =
min{P (s, a, x), P (s′, a′, x)}∑
x∈S
P (s, a, x) · (V pi1 (x)− V pi2 (x))−
∑
x∈S
P (s′, a′, x) · (V pi1 (x)− V pi2 (x))
=
∑
x∈S
(P (s, a, x)− b(x, s, a, s′, a′)) · (V pi1 (x)− V pi2 (x))
−
∑
x∈S
(P (s′, a′, x)− b(x, s, a, s′, a′)) · (V pi1 (x)− V pi2 (x))
≤
∑
x∈S
(P (s, a, x)− b(x, s, a, s′, a′)) ·max
x′
(V pi1 (x
′)− V pi2 (x′))
−
∑
x∈S
(P (s′, a′, x)− b(x, s, a, s′, a′)) ·min
x′
(V pi1 (x
′)− V pi2 (x′))
= (1−
∑
x∈S
b(x, s, a, s′, a′)) · sp(V pi1 − V pi2 ) ≤ (1− α) · sp(V pi1 − V pi2 )
Therefore
sp(F (Q1, R, ρ, P, pi)− F (Q2, R, ρ, P, pi)) = sp(P · (V pi1 − V pi2 )) ≤ (1− α) · sp(V pi1 − V pi2 ).
Now, notice that for smax = arg maxs[V pi1 (s)− V pi2 (s)] and smin = arg mins[V pi1 (s)− V pi2 (s)] we have that
V pi1 (smax)− V pi2 (smax) = Q1(smax, pi(smax))−Q2(smax, pi(smax)) ≤ max
s,a
[Q1(s, a)−Q2(s, a)]
V pi1 (smin)− V pi2 (smin) = Q1(smin, pi(smin))−Q2(smin, pi(smin)) ≥ min
s,a
[Q1(s, a)−Q2(s, a)]
Therefore sp(V pi1 − V pi2 ) ≤ sp(Q1 −Q2), which implies that
sp(F (Q1, R, ρ, P, pi)− F (Q2, R, ρ, P, pi)) ≤ (1− α) · sp(Q1 −Q2)
To obtain the statement of the theorem, we will need to relate sp(Q1−Q2) to ‖R1 −R2‖∞. The following lemma provides
a more general result, relating Q-values, reward functions and transition matrices.
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Lemma 6. Let Qpi1 and V pi1 denote Q and V values of policy pi in MDP M1 = (S,A, R1, P1) and Qpi2 denote Q values of
policy pi in MDP M2 = (S,A, R2, P2). The following holds:
‖R1 −R2‖∞ + ‖P1 − P2‖∞ · ‖V pi1 ‖∞ ≥
α2
2
· sp(Qpi1 −Qpi2 ).
where
α2 = min
s,a,s′,a′
∑
x∈S
min{P2(s, a, x), P2(s′, a′, x)}.
Proof. Notice that Qpi1 and Q
pi
2 satisfy
Qpi1 (s, a) = F (Q
pi
1 , R1, ρ
pi
1 , P1, pi)
Qpi2 (s, a) = F (Q
pi
2 , R2, ρ
pi
2 , P2, pi),
where ρpi1 and ρ
pi
2 denote the average rewards of policy pi in M1 and M2, respectively. We obtain
sp(Qpi1 −Qpi2 ) = sp(F (Qpi1 , R1, ρpi1 , P1, pi)− F (Qpi2 , R2, ρpi2 , P2, pi))
= sp(F (Qpi1 , R1, ρ
pi
1 , P1, pi)− F (Qpi1 , R2, ρpi2 , P1, pi)
+ F (Qpi1 , R2, ρ
pi
2 , P1, pi)− F (Qpi1 , R2, ρpi2 , P2, pi)
+ F (Qpi1 , R2, ρ
pi
2 , P2, pi)− F (Qpi2 , R2, ρpi2 , P2, pi))
≤ sp(F (Qpi1 , R1, ρpi1 , P1, pi)− F (Qpi1 , R2, ρpi2 , P1, pi))
+ sp(F (Qpi1 , R2, ρ
pi
2 , P1, pi)− F (Qpi1 , R2, ρpi2 , P2, pi))
+ sp(F (Qpi1 , R2, ρ
pi
2 , P2, pi)− F (Qpi2 , R2, ρpi2 , P2, pi))
≤ sp(R1 − ρpi1 · 1−R2 + ρpi2 · 1) + sp((P1 − P2) · V pi1 ) + (1− α2) · sp(Qpi1 −Qpi2 )
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 5 (i.e., sp(F (Qpi1 , R2, ρ
pi
2 , P2, pi)−F (Qpi2 , R2, ρpi2 , P2, pi)) ≤ (1−α2) · sp(Qpi1 −
Qpi2 )). Due to the properties of sp, we have
sp(R1 − ρpi1 · 1−R2 + ρpi2 · 1) = sp(R1 −R2) ≤ 2 · ‖R1 −R2‖∞ ,
and
sp((P1 − P2) · V pi1 ) ≤ 2 · ‖(P1 − P2) · V pi1 ‖∞
= 2 ·max
s,a
|
∑
s′
(P1(s, a, s
′)− P2(s, a, s′)) · V pi1 (s′)|
≤ 2 ·max
s,a
∑
s′
|(P1(s, a, s′)− P2(s, a, s′)) · V pi1 (s′)|
≤ 2 ·max
s,a
∑
s′
|(P1(s, a, s′)− P2(s, a, s′))| ·max
s′′
|V pi1 (s′′)|
≤ 2 · ‖P1 − P2‖∞ · ‖V pi1 ‖∞ ,
where ‖P1 − P2‖∞ = maxs,a
∑
s′ |P1(s, a, s′)−P2(s, a, s′)|. Putting this together with the upper bound on sp(Qpi1−Qpi2 ),
we obtain
2 · ‖R1 −R2‖∞ + 2 · ‖P1 − P2‖∞ · ‖V pi1 ‖∞ ≥ α2 · sp(Qpi1 −Qpi2 ),
which proves the claim.
We are now ready to prove the lower bound in Theorem 1.
Proof of the Lower Bound in Theorem 1:
Proof. From Lemma 6, it follows that a lower bound can be obtained by bounding sp(Q̂pi† −Qpi†) from below, where Q̂pi†
are Q-values of the target policy in the modified MDP, and Q
pi† are Q values of the target policy in the initial MDP.
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Let s′ and a′ be a state action pair that satisfy: s′, a′ = arg maxs,a χ
pi†
 (s, a). W.l.o.g. we can assume that χ
pi†
 (s′, a′) > 0,
since otherwise no modifications are needed to the original MDP and the lower bound trivially holds. We have
sp(Q
pi† − Q̂pi†) = sp(Q̂pi† −Qpi†) = max
s,a
[Q̂pi†(s, a)−Qpi†(s, a)]−min
s,a
[Q̂pi†(s, a)−Qpi†(s, a)]
≥ Q̂pi†(s′, pi†(s′))−Qpi†(s′, pi†(s′))− (Q̂pi†(s′, a′)−Qpi†(s′, a′))
= (Q̂pi†(s′, pi†(s′))− Q̂pi†(s′, a′)) + (Qpi†(s′, a′)−Qpi†(s′, pi†(s′))
≥ 
µpi†{s′;a′}(s′)
+ (Q
pi†
(s′, a′)−Qpi†(s′, pi†(s′))
=
ρpi†{s
′;a′} − ρpi† + 
µpi†{s′;a′}(s′)
= χ
pi†
 (s
′, a′),
where we used the fact that Q̂pi†(s′, pi†(s′)) ≥ Q̂pi†(s′, a′) + 
µpi†{s
′;a′}(s′)
(because pi† is robustly optimal in the modified
MDP and the transition kernel did not change) and Lemma 3 (Corollary 1) to relate Q values to average rewards ρ. Finally,
using Lemma 6 (and noting that we did not change transition matrix P ), we obtain∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥
∞
≥ α
2
· ∥∥χpi† ∥∥∞
The inequality
∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥
p
≥
∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥
∞
implies the lower bound.
F.2. Proofs for the Upper Bound and Feasibility in Theorem 1
Lemma 7. R̂ = R− χpi† is the solution of the following problem:
min
R
∥∥R−R∥∥
p
(P6)
s.t.
∑
s′
µpi†(s′) · R(s′, pi†(s′)) ≥∑
s′
µpi†{s;a}(s′) ·R(s′, pi†{s; a}(s′))+  ∀s, a 6= pi†(s),
R(s, pi†(s)) = R(s, pi†(s)) ∀s.
Proof. Since the transitions are not changed, we have∑
s′
R̂(s′, pi†{s; a}(s′)) · µ̂pi†{s;a}(s′) =
∑
s′
R̂(s′, pi†{s; a}(s′)) · µpi†{s;a}(s′)
=
∑
s′
R(s′, pi†{s; a}(s′)) · µpi†{s;a}(s′)− χpi† (s, a) · µpi†{s;a}(s)
= ρpi†{s;a} − χpi† (s, a) · µpi†{s;a}(s)
≤ ρpi†{s;a} − (ρpi†{s;a} − ρpi† + )
= ρpi† − 
= ρ̂pi† − 
=
∑
s′
µpi†(s′) · R(s′, pi†(s′))− 
which shows that the attack satisfies the first constraint of the optimization problem. The second constraint is also satisfied
as we have χpi† (s, pi†(s)) = 0
Proof of Feasibility and the Upper Bound in Theorem 1:
Proof. Consider the attack with R̂ = R−χpi† . As we showed in Lemma 7, it is the solution for problem (P6) which has all
the constraints in (P1). Thus, this attack is also a solution for (P1) which shows the feasibility of this optimization problem.
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Furthermore, this attack also provides us with an upper bound on the quality of the obtained solution, i.e., for this attack:
∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥
p
=
(∑
s,a
(
R̂(s, a)−R(s, a)
)p)1/p
=
(∑
s,a
χ
pi†
 (s, a)
p
)1/p
=
∥∥χpi† ∥∥p ,
and we know that an optimal attack achieves a lower cost (i.e., a lower value of
∥∥∥R̂−R∥∥∥
p
).
G. Proofs for Offline Attacks: Poisoning Dynamics (Section 4.3)
To prove Theorem 2, we first introduce a more constrained problem which has a tractable reformulation in Appendix G.1.
This problem enables us to prove our feasibility condition in Appendix G.3 and will also be the basis of our online dynamic
attacks. Then, in Appendix G.3, we prove the theorem.
G.1. More Constrained Problem and Reformulation
Consider the following problem
min
P,µpi†µpi†{s;a}
∥∥P − P∥∥
p
(P7)
s.t. µpi(s) =
∑
s′
P (s′, pi(s′), s) · µpi(s′) ∀s,
µpi†{s;a}(s′) =
∑
s′′
P (s′′, pi†{s; a}(s′′), s′) · µpi†{s;a}(s′′) ∀s′, s, a 6= pi†(s),∑
s′
µpi†(s′) · R(s′, pi†(s′)) ≥∑
s′
µpi†{s;a}(s′) ·R(s′, pi†{s; a}(s′))+  ∀s, a 6= pi†(s),
P (s, a, s′) ≥ δ · P (s, a, s′) ∀s, a, s′,
P (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′) ∀s, s′.
This is the exact same problem (P2) with an additional condition P (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′) for all s, s′. This
problem is also used in the online attacks (see problem (P4)). We will show that this problem has a simple reformulation
as the following:
min
P
∥∥P − P∥∥
p
(P8)
s.t. R(s, pi†(s)) +B
pi†
(s)−R(s, a) ≥ +
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · Upi†(s, s′) ∀s, a 6= pi†(s), s′,
P (s, a, s′) ≥ δ · P (s, a, s′) ∀s, a, s′,
P (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′) ∀s, s′,
where
U
pi†
(s, s′) = V
pi†
(s′) +  · Tpi†(s′, s) · 1 [s′ 6= s] .
Note that U
pi† is obtained from the initial MDP M .
Before we show these problems are equivalent, let us first characterize the minimum value of µpi†{s;a}(s). To do so, we
utilize the diameter of Markov chain defined by MDP M and policy pi†, i.e., D
pi†
= maxs,s′ T
pi†
(s, s′). Here, T
pi†
(s, s′)
is the expected time to reach s′ starting from s in MDP M under policy pi†. We have:
Lemma 8. Assume that for transition kernel P , we have P (s, pi†(s), s′) = P (s, pi†(s), s′) for all s, s′, and µpi denotes the
stationary distribution of pi under P . Then, for µpi†{s;a}(s) we have
µpi†{s;a}(s) =
1
1 +
∑
s′ 6=s P (s, a, s′)T
pi†
(s′, s)
≥ 1
1 +D
pi† ,
where D
pi†
= maxs′,s′′ T
pi†
(s′, s′′) is the diameter of MDP M with policy pi†.
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Proof. By using the fact that 1
µpi†{s;a}(s)
= Tpi†{s;a}(s, s) (see Theorem 1.21 in (Durrett & Durrett, 1999)), where
Tpi†(s′, s) is the expected time to reach s starting from s′ in the corresponding Markov chain, we obtain
1
µpi†{s;a}(s)
= Tpi†{s;a}(s, s)
= 1 +
∑
s′ 6=s
P (s, a, s′) · Tpi†{s;a}(s′, s)
= 1 +
∑
s′ 6=s
P (s, a, s′) · Tpi†(s′, s)
= 1 +
∑
s′ 6=s
P (s, a, s′) · Tpi†(s′, s)
≤ 1 + max
s′
T
pi†
(s′, s)
≤ 1 +Dpi† .
The last inequality obtained from the definition of diameter D
pi† , i.e., D
pi†
= maxs′,s′′ T
pi†
(s′, s′′) and we have used the
fact that transitions of pi† are not changed.
Lemma 9. Problem (P8) is a reformulation of (P7).
Proof. Let ρpi , Qpi , and µpi denote the average reward, Q-values, and stationary distribution of pi on MDP M =
(S,A,R, P ). The last two constraints of (P7) are repeated in (P8). The rest of conditions in (P7) are equivalent to
ρpi† ≥ ρpi†{s;a}+  for all s, a 6= pi†(s) which we should prove it is equivalent to the remaining constraint in (P8). By using
the relation between average rewards ρ and Q values from Lemma 3 (Corollary 1), we can write this condition as:
Qpi†(s, pi†(s))−Qpi†(s, a) ≥ 
µpi†{s;a}(s)
,∀a 6= pi†(s).
Due to Lemma 8, this can be rewritten as
Qpi†(s, pi†(s))−Qpi†(s, a) ≥ +  ·
∑
s′ 6=s
P (s, a, s′) · Tpi†(s′, s),∀a 6= pi†(s).
By using the recurrence relation for Q values, the definition of B
pi† , and the fact that P (s, pi†(s), .) = P (s, pi†(s), .), we
obtain that for all s and a, it is equivalent to the following
 ≤ R(s, pi†(s)) +Bpi†(s)−R(s, a)−
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) ·
[
V
pi†
(s′) +  · Tpi†(s′, s) · 1 [s′ 6= s]
]
(14)
= R(s, pi†(s)) +B
pi†
(s)−R(s, a)−
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · Upi†(s, s′). (15)
which is the condition in (P8)
G.2. Feasibility Analysis
In this section we analyze feasibility of dynamics offline attacks as formulated in problem (P2). To give a sufficient
condition for feasibility of (P2), it suffices to give a sufficient condition for feasibility of (P7) as it is a more constrained
problem. In Lemma 10, we give a sufficient and necessary condition for feasibility of (P7). The condition stated in
Theorem 2 is a simpler one showed in Corollary 2 using Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. The optimization problem (P7) has a solution P̂ if and only if for all state s and actions a 6= pi†(s) we have
C(s, a) ≥ , where
C(s, a) = R(s, pi†(s)) +B
pi†
(s)−R(s, a)− (1− δ) ·min
s′
U
pi†
(s, s′)− δ
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · Upi†(s, s′).
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Proof. We define C ′(s, a) as
C ′(s, a) = R(s, pi†(s)) +B
pi†
(s)−R(s, a)−
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · Upi†(s, s′).
The constraints of (P8) which is a reformulation of (P7) imply that we should have C ′(s, a) ≥ . Due to the constraint
P (s, a, s′) ≥ δ · P (s, a, s′), we can write
C ′(s, a) ≤ R(s, pi†(s)) +Bpi†(s)−R(s, a)− (1− δ) ·min
s′
U
pi†
(s, s′)− δ ·
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · Upi†(s, s′) = C(s, a).
Therefore, for the attack to be feasible, it has to hold that C(s, a) ≥ . To see that C(s, a) ≥  is also a sufficient condition,
let us consider transition kernel P̂ defined as
P̂ (s, a, s′) =

P (s, pi†(s), s′) if a = pi†(s)
1− δ + δ · P (s, a, s′) if a 6= pi†(s) and s′ = arg mins′′ U(s, s′′)
δ · P (s, a, s′) otherwise
For state s and action a 6= pi†(s), let smin = arg mins′′ U(s, s′′). From the definition of Q values and the fact that we only
change transitions for non-target state-action pairs, we obtain that
Q̂pi†(s, pi†(s))− Q̂pi†(s, a) = R(s, pi†(s))− ρpi† +
∑
s′
P (s, pi†(s), s′)V
pi†
(s′)
−R(s, a) + ρpi† −
∑
s′
P̂ (s, a, s′)V
pi†
(s′)
= R(s, pi†(s))−R(s, a) +Bpi†(s)− (1− δ) · V pi†(smin)− δ ·
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′)V
pi†
(s′)
= R(s, pi†(s))−R(s, a) +Bpi†(s)− (1− δ) · Upi†(s, smin)− δ ·
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′)U
pi†
(s, s′)
+ (1− δ) ·  · Tpi†(smin, s) · 1smin 6=s + δ ·
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) ·  · Tpi†(s′, s) · 1s′ 6=s
= C(s, a) +
∑
s6=s′
P̂ (s, a, s′) ·  · Tpi†(s′, s)
≥ +
∑
s6=s′
P̂ (s, a, s′) ·  · Tpi†(s′, s) = 
µ̂pi†{s;a}
,
where the last equality is due to Lemma 8. Using the relation between average rewards ρ and Q values from Lemma 3
(Corollary 1), we obtain the claim.
Finally, from Lemma 10 we derive a simpler to express sufficient condition that we use in for the main theorem of this
section.
Corollary 2. The optimization problem (P7) has a solution P̂ if for all state s and actions a 6= pi†(s) we have βpi†δ (s, a) ≥
 · (1 +Dpi†).
Proof. Note that C(s, a) from Lemma 10 is bounded by:
C(s, a) = R(s, pi†(s)) +B
pi†
(s)−R(s, a)− (1− δ) ·min
s′
U
pi†
(s, s′)− P
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · Upi†(s, s′)
≥ R(s, pi†(s)) +Bpi†(s)−R(s, a)− (1− δ) · (min
s′
V
pi†
(s′) +  ·Dpi†)− δ · (max
s′
V
pi†
(s′) +  ·Dpi†)
= β
pi
δ (s, a)− D
pi†
,
where in the last inequality we applied the definition of β
pi†
δ (s, a), i.e.
β
pi†
δ (s, a) = R(s, pi†(s))−R(s, a) +B
pi†
(s)− V pi†min − δ · sp(V
pi†
).
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Using the condition β
pi†
δ (s, a) ≥  · (1 +D
pi†
), we obtain
C(s, a) ≥  · (1 +Dpi†)− Dpi† = ,
which by Lemma 10 implies the statement.
G.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Feasibility and the upper bound: The sufficient condition in the statement of the theorem follows directly from
Corollary 2 by noting that a solution to the optimization problem (P7) is also a solution to the optimization problem (P2).
To obtain the upper bound, let us consider an attack of the following form:
P̂ (s, a, s′) = (1− λ(s, a)) · P (s, a, s′) + λ(s, a) · Ps(s, a, s′) (16)
where
Ps(s, a, s
′) =

P (s, a, s′) if a = piT (s)
1− δ + δ · P (s, a, s′) if a 6= piT (s) and s′ = arg mins′′ V pi†(s′′)
δ · P (s, a, s′) otw.
.
Here, λ(s, a) is defined for each state-action pair separately. For the above attack, note that
∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
=
(∑
s,a
(∑
s′
|P̂ (s, a, s′)− P (s, a, s′)|
)p)1/p
≤ 2 ·
(∑
s,a
λp(s, a)
)1/p
.
Hence, we want to find the minimum λ(s, a) (across all states s and a 6= pi†(s)) for which the optimization problem is
feasible.
Due to Lemma 1, for the attack to be feasible, we need to satisfy
ρ̂pi† ≥ ρ̂pi†{s;a} + ,∀a 6= pi†(s).
Using Lemma 3 (Corollary 1), we can rewrite this condition in terms of Q as
Q̂pi†(s, a)− Q̂pi†(s, pi†(s)) ≤ − 
µ̂pi†{s;a}(s)
,∀a 6= pi†(s). (17)
Moreover, V̂ pi† = V
pi† for the considered attack because it does not change the transitions of the target policy. Therefore,
we have
Q̂pi†(s, a)− Q̂pi†(s, pi†(s)) = R(s, a)− ρ̂pi† +
∑
s′
P̂ (s, a, s′) · V pi†(s′)
−R(s, pi†(s)) + ρ̂pi† −
∑
s′
P̂ (s, pi†(s), s′) · V pi†(s′)
= R(s, a) +
∑
s′
[(1− λ(s, a)) · P (s, a, s′) + λ(s, a) · Ps(s, a, s′)] · V pi†(s′)
−R(s, pi†(s))−
∑
s′
P (s, pi†(s), s′) · V pi†(s′)
= (1− λ(s, a)) · [R(s, a)− ρpi† +
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · V pi†(s′)
−R(s, pi†(s)) + ρpi† −
∑
s′
P (s, pi†(s), s′) · V pi†(s′)]
+ λ(s, a) · [R(s, a) + (1− δ) ·min
s′
V
pi†
(s′) + δ ·
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′) · V pi†(s′)
−R(s, pi†(s))−
∑
s′
P (s, pi†(s), s′) · V pi†(s′)]
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≤ (1− λ(s, a)) · [Qpi†(s, a)−Qpi†(s, pi†(s))]
+ λ(s, a) · [R(s, a)−R(s, pi†(s)) + V pi†min −B
pi†
(s) + δ · (max
s′
V
pi†
(s′)− V pi†min)]
= (1− λ(s, a)) · ρ
pi†{s;a} − ρpi†
µpi†{s;a}(s)
− λ(s, a) · βpi†δ (s, a)
= (1− λ(s, a)) · χpi†0 (s, a)− λ(s, a) · β
pi†
δ (s, a).
By Lemma 8, µ̂pi†{s;a}(s) ≥ 1
1+D
pi† . Hence, we know that the attack is successful when Q̂pi†(s, a) − Q̂pi†(s, pi†(s)) ≤
− · (1 +Dpi†), which by the above inequality implies that a sufficient condition for the attack to be successful is
λ(s, a) · χpi†0 (s, a) + λ(s, a) · β
pi†
δ (s, a) ≥  · (1 +D
piT
) + χ
pi†
0 (s, a).
Furthermore, we also know that if ρpi† ≥ ρpi†{s;a}+ , we can set λ(s, a) = 0. Therefore, the attack is successful if λ(s, a)
satisfies
λ(s, a) ≥ χ
pi†
0 (s, a) +  · (1 +D
piT
)
χ
pi†
0 (s, a) + β
pi†
δ (s, a)
· 1 [χpi† (s, a) > 0] .
By choosing the lower bound for λ(s, a), we obtain the upper bound in the statement of the theorem, i.e.:∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
≤ 2 · ‖Λ‖p , (18)
where Λ(s, a) = χ
pi†
0 (s,a)+·(1+D
piT
)
χ
pi†
0 (s,a)+β
pi†
δ (s,a)
· 1 [χpi† (s, a) > 0].
Lower bound: To prove the lower bound, we follow the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1 (the proof for the
lower bound). Let s′ and a′ be a state action pair that satisfy: s′, a′ = arg maxs,a χpi†(s, a). Let’s consider the case when
χpi†(s′, a′) > 0. We have
sp(Q
pi† − Q̂pi†) = sp(Q̂pi† −Qpi†) = max
s,a
[Q̂pi† −Qpi† ]−min
s,a
[Q̂pi† −Qpi† ]
≥ Q̂pi†(s′, pi†(s′))−Qpi†(s′, pi†(s′))− (Q̂pi†(s′, a′)−Qpi†(s′, a′))
= (Q̂pi†(s′, pi†(s′))− Q̂pi†(s′, a′)) + (Qpi†(s′, a′)−Qpi†(s′, pi†(s′))
≥ 
µ̂pi†{s′;a′}(s′)
+ (Q
pi†
(s′, a′)−Qpi†(s′, pi†(s′))
≥ + ρ
pi†{s′;a′} − ρpi†
µpi†{s′;a′}(s′)
> χ
pi†
0 (s
′, a′),
where we used the fact that Q̂pi†(s′, pi†(s′)) ≥ Q̂pi†(s′, a′) + 
µ̂pi†{s
′;a′}(s′)
(because pi† is robustly optimal in the modified
MDP) and Lemma 3 (Corollary 1) to relate Q values to average rewards ρ. When χpi†(s′, a′) = 0, we know that sp(Q
pi† −
Q̂pi†) ≥ 0 due to the properties of sp. Therefore, sp(Qpi† − Q̂pi†) = sp(Q̂pi† −Qpi†) ≥ ∥∥χpi†0 ∥∥∞.
By using Lemma 6 (but now noting that we did not change rewards R), we obtain∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
∞
·
∥∥∥V pi†∥∥∥
∞
≥ α̂
2
· ∥∥χpi†0 ∥∥∞ .
Factor α̂ can be bounded by
α̂ = min
s,a,s′,a′
∑
x
min{P̂ (s, a, x), P̂ (s′, a′, x)}
≥ min
s,a,s′,a′
∑
x
min{δ · P (s, a, x), δ · P (s′, a′, x)}
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= δ · min
s,a,s′,a′
∑
x
min{P (s, a, x), ·P (s′, a′, x)}
= δ · α.
Putting this together with the previous expression, we obtain that∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
∞
·
∥∥∥V pi†∥∥∥
∞
≥ δ · α
2
. · ∥∥χpi†0 ∥∥∞ .
The inequality
∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
≥
∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
∞
implies the lower bound.
G.4. Choosing δ
While δ can be set to small values, making the corresponding constraint in (P2) a relatively weak condition, it is important
to note that its value controls parameters of MDP M̂ that are important for practical considerations in the offline setting.
Moreover, since δ is a parameter in the optimization problems (P4) and (P7) (and (P8)), its value is also important for the
online setting.
In the case of attacks on a learning agent, our results have dependency on the agent’s regret, which in turn depends on
the properties of MDP M̂ . For example, if the agent adopts UCRL as its learning procedure, its regret will depend on the
diameter of M̂ . Hence, δ should be adjusted based on time horizon T , so that the parameters of MDP M̂ relevant for the
agent’s regret do not outweigh time horizon T .
In the case of attacks on a planning agent, setting δ to small values could result in a solution M̂ that has a large mixing
time, in which case average reward ρ might not approximate well the average of obtained rewards in a finite horizon (e.g.,
see (Even-Dar et al., 2005)). This means that the choice of δ should account for the finiteness of time horizon in practice.
We leave a more detailed analysis that includes these considerations for future work.
H. Proofs for Online Attacks: Lemma 2 (Section 5.1)
Proof of Lemma 2 Assume the learner follows an algorithm ALG which chooses the action from a distribution based
on the previous observations. Theorem 5.5.1 in (Puterman, 1994) shows that a history-independent algorithm Π exists that
chooses the action at form the distribution qt,st where the distributions qt,s are fixed and we have
∀s, a, t : PALG [st = s, at = a] = PΠ [st = s, at = a] , (19)
qt,s(a) = PALG [at = a|st = s] . (20)
Here, PALG and PΠ denote probabilities in the cases that the learner follows ALG and Π, respectively. Equation (19) means
Π has the same expected regret and missmatches as ALG. Thus it suffices to prove the theorem for Π.
First, we extend the definitions of P , R, and Q defined in Appendix D as
Q(s, d) = Ea∼d [Q(s, a)]
R(s, d) = Ea∼d [R(s, a)]
P (s, d, s′) = Ea∼d [P (s, a, s′)]
for distribution d on the actions.
Now let M = (S,A, R, P ) be the environment. Denote the Q values, V values, and average reward of pi on M by Qpi ,
V pi , and ρpi , respectively. Also let ρ∗ be average reward of pi† as pi† is -robust optimal on M . By Corollary 1, for any
s, a 6= pi†(s) we have
V pi†(s)−Qpi†(s, a) = 1
µpi†{s;a}(s)
(
ρ∗ − ρpi†{s;a})
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≥ 
µmax
Defining η = /µmax, we can write
Qpi†(s, qt,s) =
∑
a6=pi†(s)
qt,s(a)Q
pi†(s, a) + qt,s(pi†(s))V pi†(s)
≤
∑
a6=pi†(s)
qt,s(a)
(
V pi†(s)− η)+ qt,s(pi†(s))V pi†(s)
= V pi†(s)− η
(
1− qt,s(pi†(s))
)
= V pi†(s)− ηet,s,
defining et,s = 1− qt,s(pi†(s)). Using the definition of Qpi† we have
R(s, qt,s) +
∑
s′
P (s, qt,s, s
′)V pi†(s′)− V pi†(s) + ηet,s ≤ ρ∗.
This can be written in vector notation as
Rqt + (Pqt − I)V pi† + ηet ≤ ρ∗1.
Now let dt(s) = PΠ [st = s], and dt be the row vector of that. Thus, dt+1 = dtPqt . Multiplying the last inequality by dt
from left gives
dtRqt + (dt+1 − dt)V pi† + ηdtet ≤ ρ∗
⇒ηdtet ≤ ρ∗ − E [rt] + (dt − dt+1)V pi† .
Summing the inequality for t = 0 to T − 1:
η
T−1∑
t=0
dtet ≤ Tρ∗ − E
[
T−1∑
t=0
rt
]
+ (d0 − dT )V pi†
≤ E [REGRET(T,M)] + 2 ‖V pi†‖∞
Now note that
T−1∑
t=0
dtet =
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s
dt(s)et,s
=
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s
PΠ [st = s]
(
1− qt,s(pi†(s))
)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s
PΠ [st = s]PΠ [at 6= pi†(st)|st = s]
=
T−1∑
t=0
PΠ [at 6= pi†(st)]
= TE [AVGMISS(T )] .
Therefore, we have
E [AVGMISS(T )] ≤ E [REGRET(T,M)] + 2 ‖V
pi†‖∞
Tη
=
µmax
 · T
(
E [REGRET(T,M)] + 2 ‖V pi†‖∞
)
.
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I. Proofs For Online Attacks: Poisoning Rewards (Section 5.2)
Proof of Theorem 3 From Lemma 7, R̂ = R − χpi† is a solution for (P3) which is the same as (P1) with an additional
constraint. This means that R̂ is also a solution for (P1). Thus, pi† is -robust optimal in M̂ = (S,A, R̂, P ). It is also
obvious that the attack makes the learner learn in the MDP M̂ . Lemma 2 immediately proves the bound on expected
average missmatches:
E [AVGMISS(T )] ≤ K(T, M̂)
T
.
Since χpiT (s, a) = 0 for a = piT (s)), we have
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(R̂t(st, at)−R(st, at))p
]
= E
[
T−1∑
t=0
χ
pi†
 (st, at)
p
]
= E
[
T−1∑
t=0
1 [at 6= pi(st)]χpi† (st, at)p
]
≤ ∥∥χpi† ∥∥p∞ TE [AVGMISS(T )]
≤ ∥∥χpi† ∥∥p∞K(T, M̂),
As p ≥ 1, note that the function f(x) = x1/p is concave, so by jensen inequality, for a random variable X we have
E [f(X)] ≤ f(E [X]). We can write
E [AVGCOST(T )] =
1
T
E
( T∑
t=1
(R̂t(st, at)−R(st, at))p
)1/p
≤ 1
T
E
[
T∑
t=1
(R̂t(st, at)−R(st, at))p
]1/p
≤
∥∥χpi† ∥∥∞
T
K(T, M̂)1/p
J. Proofs For Online Attacks: Poisoning Dynamics (Section 5.3)
As we mentioned in the main text, the optimization problem (P4) can be transformed into a tractable convex problem with
liner constraints – this is shown in Appendix G, where we used such an attack to obtain the upper bound of Theorem 2. We
refer the reader to Section G.1, and in particular, the optimization problems (P7) and (P8) for more details.
Proof of Theorem 4 By Lemma 9, the solution P̂ for the problem (P4) can be efficiently calculated with a convex
program with linear constraints. As (P4) is the same as (P2) with just an additional constraint, this P̂ is a feasible solution
for (P2) and by Theorem 2, pi† is -robust optimal in M̂ = (S,A,R, P̂ ) which is what the learner observes. Lemma 2 gives
the bound for expected average missmatches:
E [AVGMISS(T )] ≤ K(T, M̂)
T
To show the upper bound we consider the attack (16) we used to prove the upper bound in Theorem 2:
P̂ ′(s, a, s′) = (1− Λ(s, a)) · P (s, a, s′) + Λ(s, a) · Ps(s, a, s′)
Since we are using the optimal solution of (P4), and by equation (18) we have∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥
p
≤
∥∥∥P̂ ′ − P∥∥∥
p
≤ 2 · ‖Λ‖p
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Using this we can write
E
[
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥P̂t(st, at, .)− P (st, at, .)∥∥∥p
1
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥P̂ (st, at, .)− P (st, at, .)∥∥∥p
1
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
1 [at 6= pi†(st)]
∥∥∥P̂ (st, at, .)− P (st, at, .)∥∥∥p
1
]
≤
∥∥∥P̂ − P∥∥∥p
∞
TE [AVGMISS(T ]
≤ (2 · ‖Λ‖∞ )pK(T, M̂)
As p ≥ 1 similar to proof of Theorem 3 by jensen inequality we have
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